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ARGUMENT AND REBUTTAL
The Industrial Commission' s decision and its new reading of Neel v. Western Construction,

Inc., 14 7 Idaho 146, 206 P .3d 852 (2009), should be rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. It is not
in keeping with the intent and spirit of the case and sets the stage for surety misconduct.
In response to Mr. Millard's appeal brief, Defendants argue the following: ( 1) the Industrial
Commission did not err in declining to apply the Neel Doctrine to the physical therapy and injection
therapy bills at issue; (2) the Neel Doctrine should not apply to Dr. Garg's medical treatment
provided to Mr. Millard subsequent to October 2013 because the treatment was never denied; (3) the
Neel Doctrine has no application to situations where the surety proves the claimant has no exposure

to paying the full invoiced amounts of medical expenses; and (4) Mr. Millard is not entitled to
attorney's fees on appeal. For the reasons stated below, each of these arguments should be rejected
by the Court.
Instead,

Court should find the Neel Doctrine trigger for payment of medical expenses at

the full invoiced amount is the employer's/su rety's act of denying payment for the related medical
treatment. It is that act which places a claimant in the position of having to seek out other resources
for paying outstanding medical bills and for subsequent related medical treatment. Specifically, the
Court should find Mr. Millard has proven he is entitled to reimbursement at the full invoiced amount
of all medical charges, pursuant to the Neel Doctrine, for his claimed physical therapy and injection
therapy expenses. The Court should also find Mr. Millard is entitled to his attorney fees on appeal.
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The Industrial Commission Erred in Declining to Apply the Neel Doctrine to the
the Injection Therapy Bills in Question.
The underlying decision by the Industrial Commission in this case incorrectly applies the
Neel Doctrine.

Mr. Millard fully lays out the bases for this contention in his appeal brief.

Defendants initial argument in response is that the Neel Doctrine only applies in those cases where
the entire workers' compensation claim has been rejected by the surety. To be clear, this is not a
position taken by the Industrial Commission in the underlying case and was, therefore, not an issue
appealed by Mr. Millard. As such, the Court should ignore this argument.
Furthermore, there is no basis for drawing such a distinction. Nothing in the Neel case even
suggests the Court was limiting the application of the Doctrine to those specific circumstances. In
addition, such a distinction is not meaningful nor necessary.

It should also be noted that the term "claim" is not defined in the Idaho Workers'
Compensation statutes 1; however, the dictionary defines the term as "a demand for something as due;
an assertion of a right or an alleged right" or as "a request or demand for payment in accordance with
an insurance policy, a workers' compensation law, etc." See http://www.dictionary.com. Thus, the
term's definition can apply to a specific claim for benefits within the workers' compensation case.
This could include a "claim" for specific medical benefits such as a surgery, additional physical
therapy treatments, medications or other specific medical treatment. There is no indication the Idaho

1

Although no specific statute defines the term, Idaho Code § 72-706, for example, makes clear
that a "claim" can mean a challenge to the denial of a specific workers' compensation benefit.
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was

the Neel case to mean the

term

case as

opposed to a specific claim for benefits under the workers' compensation system. Furthermore, the
Industrial Commission has not used the term restrictively in its interpretation of Neel. Niebuhr v.
AAPEXConstruction; Inc.; a/k/a, AC! Northwest, Inc., IC 2006-513568, p. 18,, 71 (2011 Idaho Ind.

Com.) (applying Neel to a case where the surety had only denied certain medical benefits but had
otherwise accepted the claim).
In support of their argument that the Neel Doctrine only applies to situations where the entire
case has been denied by the surety, Defendants create a "straw man" argument which they then easily
and unsurprisingly defeat. Defendants contend Mr. Millard is making the argument that if he can
show that one denied medical bill is subsequently deemed to be compensable, then Defendants must
pay the full invoiced amount for all of the medical expenses, even those that Defendants had
previously paid timely under the fee schedule. This is not Mr. Millard's position. Mr. Millard's
position is simply that any denied medical treatment (whether due to an explicit denial or the
adjuster's failure to timely adjust the claim) later deemed compensable by the Commission must be
paid by the Surety at the full invoiced a..'11ount. This is exactly what the Neel Doctrine requires:
Any medical bills incurred during the time from which the accident occurred to the
time when the claim was deemed compensable fall outside the workers'
compensation regulatory scheme and may not be reviewed for reasonableness and
must be paid in full by the surety.
Neel, 147 Idaho at 149,206 P.3d at 855.

Defendants' argument, taken to its logical conclusion, would allow a surety to accept and pay
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treatment

medical treatment at

a

and without medical

justification, but escape the consequences of the Neel Doctrine for doing so.
Defendants next use the example of the injured worker with an industrial knee injury who
is referred by his orthopedic surgeon for physical therapy for his knee and low back.

The

accompanying medical chart note does not specifically state the low back injury is related to the
industrial knee injury, but the physical therapist prepares a bill and submits it to the surety for
payment of the knee and low back treatment.
Defendants' example goes on to say that the surety denies the low back treatment and persists
in the denial until she eventually receives clarification of the causation issue by the orthopedic
surgeon. The surgeon states in a subsequent chart note that the knee injury caused an altered gait
which then produced the low back injury. Defendants go on to argue that they should not be
prevented from

denying

treatment and then changing their position once they receive the

additional proof they seek, as demonstrated by their example.
The problem with Defendants' example is that they characterize the delay in payment of the
low back therapy as a denial. That is not how parties to a workers' compensation claim treat such
expected delays. In cases like Defendants' example, the delay is understandable. The adjuster needs
to obtain the medical opinion it needs to justify the payment or denial of the low back treatment.
In the case at hand, the delay in paying the disputed injection and physical therapy was not
minor. It lasted for months and even years. The delay was not for a specific purpose, such as
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for

It appeared to be

sake

delay or for a lack of caring

about adjusting the file in a timely manner. Ms. Carr did not delay the payment

the

medical treatment while she sought out more information. In fact, she claimed to be unaware of the
treatment.
The Commissio n heavily criticized her lack of engagement and knowledge about the file
because it was obvious Mr. Millard's need for medical treatment was not going away and his
cognitive conditions did not allow him to navigate his medical treatment without significant
assistance. Delays in paying medical expenses for legitimate purposes which a surety is pursuing
diligently are understood to be part of the workers' compensation system. That is not what was
2
taking place in Mr. Millard's case.

In the case at hand, the Industrial Commissio n awarded the full invoiced amount of Dr.
Garg's October 2012 to October 2013 treatment because, at the time of decision, it was yet unpaid.
All other disputed medical bills were excluded from

Neel doctrine by the Commission, however,

because the Surety paid those bills immediately before and after the hearing. That is an incorrect
understanding of the intent and spirit of the Neel case. Neel was never intended to allow a surety a
two- to three-year window in which to gamble on their decision to deny benefits, then reverse them
at the last second and still retain the privilege of the fee schedule.

A determinatio n of what constitutes too long of a delay is unnecessary. First, that particular
issue is not being appealed in this case. It is a tangential issue arising from Defendants' argument.
Second, the workers' compensatio n system does a good job of working many of these issues out without
requiring Commission involvement.
2
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new

create an

Neel to

encourages surety misconduct. It becomes too easy for a surety to deny claims when there is little
or no risk. All the surety has to do is cut off benefits early, wait for a hearing, and see how it goes.

If the hearing seems to have gone in favor of the claimant, the surety has a large window of time (ten
months in this case) to make remedial payments at fee schedule rate. They are no worse off for
having gambled.
In the case at hand, that is exactly what the surety did. Ms. Carr repeatedly ignored requests
for treatment and payment for over two years, then made some 11th hour payments on the eve of
hearing. After the hearing but before the decision, she had ample time to contemplate exposure and
began issuing additional payments at the fee schedule rate. She cleaned up her mess just in time for
her post-hearing brief in which she could now claim compliance.
For a better understanding

to the following table:

the various medical bills at issue,

DATE INCURRED

DATE PAID

NEEL APPLICATION

Physical
Therapy

September 2011
through Novembe r
2011

Paid February 2015 two months after
hearing. Paid at fee
schedule rate directly to
provider.

Commission decision said
Neel does not apply
because Surety paid it
before the August 2015
decision.

Dr. Garg's
office visits
and steroid
injections.

October 2012
through October
2013

Paid November 2015
Paid at full invoiced
amount to Claimant 's
attorney.

Commission ordered this
treatment to be paid at full
invoiced amount per Neel
because it had not been
paid as of the August
2015 decision.
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I

office visits
and steroid
injections.

October 13
through October
2014

Some were paid
October 2014 - one
week before hearing.
Some were paid
February 2015-two
months after hearing.
Paid at fee schedule rate
directly to provider.

Commission decision said
Neel does not apply
because Surety paid it
before the August 2015
decision.

In August 2015, the Commission found in Claimant's favor that all these benefits were indeed
compensable; some subject to Neel, some not Most of the above benefits were not expressly denied,
they were simply ignored (which compelled Mr. Millard to regard them as a denial and then contract
for his own treatment). The Commission also regarded them as denied due to, in the words of the
Commission, "passive negligence" on the part of the adjuster. R., p. 27,, 66.
Defendants, in their response brief, continue to maintain that the adjuster didn't know about
these charges and/or the facts compelling her to pay them. The Commission's Findings of Fact has
already rejected that argument. The Commission describes in detail the many letters and phone calls
from Claimant to Defendants regarding the pertinent facts, as well as the providers' attempts at
contact with the Surety. The Surety had every opportunity to learn about and address Mr. Millard's
medical needs, favorably or not, well before the case ramped back into litigation.
The Supreme Court's establishment of the Neel Doctrine was, in-part, to prevent this very
kind of mischief. Once a surety has made a denial (whether an express denial or simply a failure to
adjust), forcing the claimant out into the marketplace to contract for his own medical treatment, the
surety loses the privilege of using the fee schedule. The claimant and the doctor, having been forced
-7-

own arrangement, cannot later be forced
to accept a fee schedule statute that no longer governs them.
Should the Commis sion's decision stand, a surety's eagerness to avoid costly claims coupled

,x1ith the low risk of doing so will surely increase the incidence of improperly denied claims.

It will

Industrial
burden not just the injured worker, but also the physician, the other payors, and even the
Commission itself.
of
More and more claimants will be burdened with either self-pay or a combination
sation
subrogation plus out-of-pocket payments. Some will simply give up on the workers' compen
system, frustrated that medical treatment prescribed by a surety-authorized treating physicia

n is being

treatment
denied by the adjuster without a medical basis. Physicians will end up providing medical
without payment or with paymen t but at a lower rate of compensation than they would have
had the surety

received

approved the treatment when prescribed and after proper review. Public and

medical
private non-industrial health care insurance payors will also bear the burden of paying for
dened
treatment the sureties should be paying. Finally, the Industrial Commis sion will be overbur

by an increase in hearings. After all, the Commis sion's new approach to the Neel Doctrine would
ts to
make it very tempting for sureties to pull the denial trigger early and often and force claiman
challenge the denial at hearing.
Defendants argue that the Neel Doctrine does not apply in these situations because claiman

ts

they are
should not receive the full invoiced amount since that is not the payment amount to which
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amount.

another payor exists,

such as a public or private non-industrial health insurance carrier, the claimant is still exposed to the
out-of-pocket portion as well as the amount of the subrogation claim being temporarily paid by the
non-industrial health insurance carrier. In addition, conditional payments made by non-industrial
health insurance carriers are not easy to obtain, nor are they guaranteed to remain. They can be
reversed at any time, leaving a claimant exposed to the full invoiced amount.
Even if the claimant is not exposed to the contractually adjusted amount of the medical bill,
it should be recognized that the surety's denial of medical treatment pushes the claimant into "the
wilderness" where "he must go out and strike his own bargain with providers or with his health
insurer, and may therefore be liable for payments that may be well in excess of payments authorized
under the workers' compensation fee schedule." Chapman v. Trinity Health Corp., 2014 IIC 0092
(2014 Idaho Ind. Com.).
For Defendants to complain that they have to pay more than the scheduled rate and that Mr.
Millard reaps a small savings from it rings hollow. It is much like the man who sets his own home
ablaze and then complains about the manner in which the fire department puts it out. The surety
certainly can choose how it adjusts a claim, but it cannot choose the consequences of its actions. The
Idaho Industrial Commission recognizes that Neel is designed to ensure claimants have sufficient
funds, to "discharge the obligation" they make "outside the workers' compensation system ... for
the payment of medical bills .... " Id. ("We believe that Neel represents the court's attempt to create
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obligations

might

created

between an injured worker, his attorney, and some third party outside the workers' compensation
system.").
In addition, the Industrial Commission has concluded the following:
Whether a claimant may receive a windfall after a surety has chosen not to pay for
covered benefits is less important than providing incentive for a surety to pay
according to statutory requirements in the first place .... Moreover, the concept of
"windfall" does not account for the financial and emotional burden defendants left
claimants to bear as he was forced to seek other sources of payment, to choose how
much and how expensive medical care he could afford and how long he was forced
to suffer from conditions that were Defendant's obligation to pay.
Ellis v. C-A-L Stores Co., Inc., 2013 IIC 0076, ~ 71 (2013 Idaho Ind. Com.). Similarly, the Industrial
Commission has held:
assumption that an injured worker who contracts for medical
Neel is premised on
care outside the worker's compensation system has, or may have, exposure to pay the
amount of medical bills incurred with connection with his treatment
full
Robinson v. Rocky Mountain Insulation, LLC, 2013 IIC 0053 (2013 Idaho Ind. Com.).
To a provider, accepting a workers' compensation patient is already a risky undertaking. As
seen in this case,

Clegg refused to even accept Mr. Millard as a patient because he was involved

in litigation. A physician's ultimate objective seeing a patient through to the best possible medical
outcome - is commonly interrupted by an early denial. The physician then has to choose between
leaving his or her patient out in the cold with no treatment or carrying the cost of that treatment him
or herself. Often a patient's non-industrial health insurance is more difficult to access because its
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now

medical treatment recommended by the

is not

surety-approved physician. If the Commission' s Neel reading stands, providers would be at even
greater risk of early denials by a surety. Physicians willing to accept the perils of a workers'
compensation claim will become scarce. Medical providers will be reluctant, to say the least, to
carry a balance on their books for years only to be offered a reduced rate of payment in the end. The
physician left the fee schedule rate behind when the surety rejected the treatment. The same surety
should not be able to force the physician back under the fee schedule rate.
As to non-industrial health insurance carriers, whether public or private, an increased number
are put in the position of making conditional payments on an injury they know to be industrial in the
hopes that two to three years down the road they will get their money back. lfthe claimant prevails
at hearing, the non-industrial health insurance payor would be reimbursed, but not entirely. It must
reduce its subrogation claim to reflect a proportionate share of the attorney fees and costs associated
with the recovery made on its behalf by the claimant and his or her attorney.
Even the Industrial Commission would suffer under this new reading. Sureties would be
emboldened to deny claims for any arguable reason and willing to take it all the way to hearing
because the risk is so small. The Industrial Commission would be burdened with more claims. Or,
even worse, the opposite could be true. Claimants may choose not to fight for their benefits because
the resultant recovery is only enough to pay the medical bills. Attorneys would have no incentive
to take on such cases because it would be difficult to better their clients' position by pursuing
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no

for the attorney to

case.

non-industrial insurance carriers and medical providers paying for the medical treatment

result
sureties

should be paying.
The bottom line is that strict enforcement of the Neel Doctrine by the Idaho Supreme Court
and
will ensure that sureties perform their adjustment obligations with more careful, accurate
workers '
medically-based consideration. This will protect Idaho workers and the integrity of the
compensation system.

II.

Dr. Garg's Treatment Subsequent to October 2013 Falls Under the Neel Doctrine.
Defendants argue the Neel Doctrin e does not apply to payments the Surety made for injection

it did not
therapy Dr. Garg provided to Mr. Millard after October 2013. Defendants' position is that
deny that medical treatment.

is a sanitized version of the facts which ignore important realities.

of
Specifically, Ms. Carr negligently adjusted Mr. Millard 's claim and denied payment
ts for
injection therapy from October 2012 to October 2013. She also failed to make paymen
a hearing
injection therapy after October 2013 she was not even disputing. Only when faced with
were made
did she make eleventh hour paymen ts for the undisputed treatment. Even more payments
nts
four months after hearing, but before the Commis sion's decision. Thus, the reality is that Defenda
to do so
refused to pay for the injection therapy Dr. Garg performed after October 2013 until forced
sion's
by the hearing process and an obvious inability to justify its refusal. It is only the Commis
ions of
unique interpretation of the Neel Doctrine (Paragraph 49 of the Findings of Fact, Conclus

-12-

Defendants to

and
not being denied.

If the Court rejects the statement of law in Paragraph 49, then Defendants may not review
for reasonableness Mr. Millard's denied medical bills incurred prior to the time the claim was
deemed compensable. This includes Dr. Garg' s injection therapy treatment bills after October 2013.
Defendants bolster their argument by repeating excuses they raised in their briefing before
the Commission; however, those excuses were soundly rejected in the Commission' s Findings of
Fact:
Numerous examples of Surety's delay in responding to requests,
64.
ignoring requests, and "buck passing" were presented at hearing. Surety's rebuttal
was not persuasive ....
hearing; Trudi Beck provided a detailed time line of interaction
65.
between the parties. Too often, that time line was expressed in periods of months,
if not years, to get a substantive, although often incorrect, response from Surety.
R., pp. 26-27,

,i, 64-65.

The Commission characterized the case adjusting as "one of 'passive

negligence."' Id., p. 27, ,I 66.
The Commission also made the following Findings of Fact regarding the injection therapy
treatment from October 2012 to October 2013:
. .. In the present case, Claimant had ceased treatment with his then24.
treating physician long before beginning treatment with Dr. Garg. Claimant, through
his attorney, had made it known he had lost confidence in his treater. While Dr.
Garg's name may not have specifically surfaced untii August, 2013, Surety should
have known, in light of Claimant's continuing pain management issues, he would
have been seeking treatment from someone other than the authorized treater.
-13-

Garg for treatment,
discovered Claimant had gone to
the chance to review the nature of his past
it
treatment, namely steroid injections, had the after-the-fact opportunity to meet its
obligations to pay Claimant's previous, but reasonably-incurred medical expenses.
See, e.g., Seward v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, et al, 138 Idaho 509, 512, 65 P.3d
531, 534 (2003). The fact Surety subsequently authorized the same treatment
previously rendered by Dr. Garg, (ESI), is an indication Surety, at least at that time,
felt the treatment was not unreasonable.
Claimant had a right to obtain medical treatment, and the weight of
26.
the evidence supports the proposition that Surety hampered his ability to get such
treatment by delaying decisions on change of physician, while aware of the fact
Claimant needed on-going medical treatment which was not being provided by
Surety's approved physician.
Certainly, it would have been better if Dr. Garg had provided billing
27.
and reports to Surety in a timely fashion. It would have helped if Claimant had
informed his counsel he was seeing Dr. Garg. Claimant complicated the issue when
he utilized his VA benefits and Medicare to pay for treatment related to this industrial
accident. However, none of those things exonerate Surety from performing its
obligation under Idaho Code§ 72-432(1) in the unique circumstances of this case.
is obligated to pay for Dr. Garg's treatment from October 2012
28.
through the time he became an authorized provider in November 2013

Id., pp. 14-15, iliI 24-28. Based on the Commission' s Findings of Fact, the Court should reject
Defendants' explanations and excuses for why the Surety did not do a better job of adjusting this
case.

III.

The Neel Doctrine Applies Even When the Payor of Medical Expenses Pays Less than
the Full Invoiced Amount.
Defendants argue the Neel Doctrine should not apply when the surety proves the claimant

has no exposure for the full invoiced amounts of the medical treatment. It is important to note that
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not make this holding

the underlying case. Rather,

is another

modification of the Neel Doctrine being espoused by Defendants that is not part of this appeal.
Defendants' theory has never been a part of the Neel Doctrine. The Industrial Commission
understands this, as evidenced by its own decisions subsequent to Neel. After the Idaho Supreme
Court issued the Neel decision, the Industrial Commission took up the following questions in

Aspiazu v. Homedale Tire, 2012 WL 369793, 9 (2012 Idaho Ind.Com.):
What happens, however, where the evidence establishes that Claimant does not have
an obligation to pay the full invoiced amount of the bill in question? What happens,
in the case of an injured worker with non-occupational health insurance, when the
carrier satisfies the provider's bill for a sum much lower than the invoiced amount,
under terms which protect the injured worker from balance billing by the provider?
In both cases, Claimant's obligation is finite, and represents an amount considerably
less than l 00% of the invoiced amount of the bills.
After reviewing the Neel case, the Industrial Commission concluded the Idaho Supreme Court
considered these scenarios

making its decision. Id. In Neel,

evidence before the Idaho

Supreme Court showed some of the medical bills owed by Neel were paid by her non-occupational
group health coverage. Id. The Neel case makes it clear the Court was aware that non-occupational
health insurance providers may pay much less than the invoiced amount of the medical bills due to
contractual adjustments such insurance carriers make with the providers and that these contractual
adjustments protect the insured from balance billing. Id.
As noted above, claimants are indeed exposed to having to repay the full invoiced amount
of medical expenses. Even if another payor exists, such as public or private non-industrial health
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lS

portion as

to

as the amount

the

subrogation claim being temporarily paid by the non-occupational health insurance carrier. In
addition, conditional payments made by non-occupational health insurance carriers do not just
happen. They require work to obtain. Furthermore, they can disappear much faster than they are
obtained.
Even if there is a contractual adjustment for the non-occupational industrial health insurance
carrier's payment of medical expenses for which the claimant is not responsible, it should be noted
that the surety placed the claimant in the position of contracting for his own medical treatment in the
first place.

IV.

Mr. Millard Is Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal.
Defendants also argue Mr. Millard should not be entitled to attorney fees for two reasons.

First, they argue, Mr. Millard should not prevail on the two issues presented in his appeal. For the
reasons articulated

Mr. Millard's appeal briefing and to be presented at oral argument, the Court

should reject Defendant' s first argument.
Second, Defendants argue Mr. Millard should not be entitled to attorney fees because this
is a case of first impression. Defendants contend Mr. Millard is asking the Idaho Supreme Court to
extend the Neel Doctrine to cover areas to which it has not yet been applied, namely: (1) instances
where the surety has denied something less than the full claim; (2) situations where the surety
initially denies the claim but then pays it prior to the Industrial Commission determining the claim
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cases
invoiced amount

the claimant's potential exposure

payment

full

the medical expense does not exist. The Court should reject this argument as

well.
This is not a case of first impression. Defendants have taken a legal doctrine which the Idaho
Supreme Court has clearly articulated and attempted to create confusion where none exists. The
Neel Doctrine was vvritten for broad application to every type of workers' compensation case where

a surety has denied a claim for payment of medical treatment prescribed by the claimant's treating
physician which the Industrial Commission later deems compensable. As noted in Mr. Millard's
argument above, the Doctrine applies whether the surety denied specific treatment or the entire
claim.
Furthermore, the trigger for application of the Doctrine is the denial of the medical treatment,
not the Industrial Commission' s decision of compensability. The decision of compensability merely
perfects the claimant's right to payment of the full invoiced amount of the medical expenses.
Finally, this Court created the Neel Doctrine with a clear understanding that when a claimant
is forced out into the marketplace to find a way of paying for his medical expenses, those expenses
might be paid by a private or public insurance company. In those situations, the Court understood
the private or public payors would typically contractually adjust the payment to the medical provider
to an amount less than the full invoiced bill.
Thus, each of these scenarios was implicitly or explicitly considered when the Idaho Supreme
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is not a case
award

impression.

should

Millard his attorney fees on appeal.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above and in Mr. Millard's opening brief, the Idaho Supreme Court
should reject the new rule created by the Idaho Industrial Commission in Paragraph 49 of its
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation. Instead, the Court should find that the
Neel Doctrine trigger for payment of medical expenses at the full invoice amount is the

employer' sfsurety's act of denying payment for the related medical treatment. The Court should find
that Mr. Millard has proven he is entitled to reimbursement at the full invoiced amount of all medical
charges, pursuant to the Neel Doctrine, for his claimed physical therapy and injection therapy
expenses and should award
DATED

Millard his attorney fees on appeal.

16th day of March, 2016.

JAMES D. RUCHTI
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